Problems of European security: positions of the population of Ukraine by Pashkov, Mikhail
RAZUMKOV CENTRE  NATIONAL SECURITY & DEFENCE  ¹9, 2001 27
NATO THROUGH THE EYES OF UKRAINIANS: 
A CHAIN OF PROBLEMS AND PARADOXES
Regarding the present and future systems of
European security, one should begin with NATO — the
key military-political player on the continent. What does
NATO look like in the eyes of Ukrainians? We ought to
remember that, according to the Democratic Initiatives
Foundation, back in 1997 only 17.3% believed NATO
to be an aggressive bloc. Since then, this number has
grown sharply. There has been a stable trend in
Ukrainian citizens’ visibly negative attitude to NATO.
This can be seen from the returns of nationwide socio-
logical polls conducted by UCEPS in June 20002 and
August, 2001. The respective figures are presented in the
following diagram “What is NATO primarily?” on the
next page.
As can be seen from the diagram, despite the fact that
the majority of Ukraine’s population (53.8% in 2000,
51.9% in 2001) do not view NATO as an aggressive mil-
itary bloc, the number of those who agree with this
appraisal remains large (46.2% and 48.1%). That is, the
number of respondents whose attitude to the Alliance is
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The European continent is undergoing two processes which are important to Ukraine from the
point of view of its foreign political priorities — the European Union’s enlagement and, parallel to
that, — the formation of its military component in the framework of the Common European Security
and Defence Policy (CESDP).
In the wake of the terrorist acts in the USA, problems of security have assumed special importance.
What should the EU’s military structure be like? What functions will it perform, and how will it co-oper-
ate with NATO? What is Ukraine’s place and role in the process of the European security system’s
transformation? How do Ukrainians feel about this?
In order to determine their stance on these problems, Sociological Service of Ukrainian Centre for
Economic and Political Studies (UCEPS) named after Olexander Razumkov conducted a nation-wide
poll from August 14 to 23, 2001, among 2007 respondents aged 18 and up1.
The results give rise to serious questions. In particular, why do our citizens give preference to
Ukraine’s contacts with yet hypothetical European rapid reaction force rather than the real NATO?
Why, despite the political and economic advantages of co-operation with the Alliance, is the attitude
to it in Ukrainian society far from friendly?
1
To be sure, the problems of European security are of a complex nature, and it is no wonder that some assessments made by ordinary citizens are rather
relative, since almost a third of respondents is incompetent in those issues. Furthermore, respondent positions on a number of problems are only being formed
and will change with time. This is not the reason however to ignore those assessments. Ukraine’s course towards European integration (particularly in the
defence sector) should be clear for the public, rest on popular support and meet people’s expectations.
2
The results of the survey were analysed in an article by UCEPS experts A.Bychenko and L.Polyakov “How much of NATO do Ukrainians need?”. See:
Razumkov Centre, 2000. — Kyiv, 2001, p. 390-398.
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3
It should be added that according to the results of the UCEPS survey held in June, 2000, 55.1% of respondents was sure that NATO had no right to interfere in
the affairs of any other state without a UN sanction. The number of those who believes that NATO has such right fell almost two-fold — from 11.9% to 6.2%.
negative is nearly half the adult population of Ukraine.
Also, some changes in positions can hardly be in
NATO’s favour. The number of those who view NATO
as a defence alliance has dropped considerably (almost
by 4%). The small percentage of those who are con-
vinced that NATO is a peacekeeping organisation
remains practically unchanged.
This trend in the public attitude to NATO corre-
sponds absolutely logically to the trends in assessing the
process of the Alliance’s enlargement. Here, too, the
comparison of the June 2000 and the August 2001
returns shows rather alarming trends.
The number of those who, for various reasons,
believe the NATO enlargement process to be
unfavourable has grown notably — from 46.1% to 50.2%
(See Diagram “Attitude of Ukrainian citizens to NATO
enlargement”). As we can see, among the half of respon-
dents concerned about the Alliance’s eastward enlarge-
ment, the portion of those who believe that it may result
in Ukraine’s forced involvement in the NATO-Russia
confrontation has grown considerably (from 19.5% to
26.2%). Thus, every fourth respondent is concerned
about the development of relations between the Alliance
and our eastern neighbour. (Let us note this “alarming
figure”, because we will return to “the Russian factor”
in Ukraine — EU — NATO relations further). At the
same time, one more trend is evident: a 6% decrease in
the number of those who believe the NATO enlarge-
ment process to be favourable for the strengthening of
the democratic security system in Europe.
Superficially, the situation looks paradoxical. With no
other international structure does Ukraine have such a
high level of military co-operation, favourable both polit-
ically and economically. But almost every second (!)
Ukrainian is critical about NATO and does not hail, mild-
ly speaking, its eastward enlargement. So what are the
reasons?
NEGATIVE REASONS
In our opinion, there are several reasons for
Ukrainians’ negative attitude to NATO. First, the neg-
ative stance is certainly caused by conservative-nostalgic
sentiments with a certain part of Ukraine’s
population — the “legacy” of Soviet-era anti-NATO
propaganda. Second, along with the strengthening of
Russia’s influence on Ukraine of late, Russia’s relation-
ships with NATO remain tense (particularly around the
problem of the Alliance’s enlargement). Russian mass
media have very strong positions in Ukraine’s informa-
tion space, thus influencing Ukrainians’ attitude to
NATO. The biased and non-objective coverage of
NATO’s activities is directly projected on the Ukrainian
public and reflected on its appraisal of NATO. Third,
most Ukrainians are ignorant about the specific fields of
Ukraine’s co-operation with NATO, particularly within
the framework of the Partnership for Peace Programme.
Almost two-thirds of respondents (64.4%) either do not
know anything at all about the programme, or that
Ukraine participates in it. Western information about
NATO does not reach the rank-and-file Ukrainian. The
NATO Information and Documentation Centre in Kyiv
can hardly be blamed for this. But its activity, especial-
ly during the military operation in the Balkans in 1999,
for instance, can hardly be called highly effective.
These reasons may produce an impression that
NATO is appraised by some nostalgically-minded
Ukrainian who knows little about the Alliance and looks
upon it through “eastern” eyes. But every joke, as we
know, has a grain of truth...
The fourth reason is the attitude to the Alliance’s oper-
ation in the Balkans (particularly the fact that Ukraine’s
position was not taken into account. The point is not
some peculiar attitude of Ukrainians to Yugoslavia, but
rather the fact that the majority of them (56.6%) are con-
vinced that, unauthorised by the UN, NATO had no right
whatsoever to intervene in that sovereign country’s inter-
nal affairs, even to solve humanitarian problems3
(Diagram “Does NATO have a right to intervene in inter-
nal affairs of countries for solving humanitarian problems?”).
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Thus, the majority of Ukrainians deny NATO this
right. It should be especially stressed, however (and this
is important in principle!), that the respondents hold
the same position on the activities by the EU rapid
reaction force. Nearly half of the Ukrainian population
(44.7%) are convinced that the EU has no right to inter-
vene in internal affairs of countries to solve humanitari-
an problems. At the same time, 37.7% believe that the
EU does have that right. (In particular, 25.5% of
respondents are positive that intervention actions can be
applied to EU member- and candidate-countries; 6% —
to countries on Europe’s territory; 6.2% — to any coun-
tries within the zone of EU interests). 17.6% of respon-
dents abstained. Although the EU leadership cannot
answer this question definitely. It can be presumed,
however, that if a European “mini-NATO” is created,
Ukrainian citizens’ attitudes to it will most likely be the
same as their attitude to the existing Alliance, the
Balkan actions by which show a certain “crisis of the
genre” that has been proven by the recent events in
Macedonia. What will integration with the EU look like
in the eyes of most Ukrainians? — Joining “an aggres-
sive military bloc”?
UKRAINE-NATO RELATIONS: 
POSSIBLE SCENARIOS
As can be seen from the above returns, the
Ukrainian society shows a steady trend (at least for these
two years) of criticism toward NATO among a plurality
of the population. There may be different views on the
Alliance, but it is impossible to disregard this powerful
and most influential military-political structure. What
should Ukraine’s relationships with NATO be like? The
opinions held by Ukrainians on that score are certainly
of interest.
A complete picture of opinions (in comparison with
the year 2000) is shown in the Diagram “Which form of
relations with NATO corresponds to Ukraine’s national
interests?”.
Thus, out of the various forms of Ukraine’s relations
with NATO, its non-aligned (neutral) status is believed
by the major part of the population to best correspond
to our national interests (although the number of those
who favour this option has somewhat dropped — from
45.6% to 42.1%). There has been a visible (almost
twofold) decrease in the number of respondents who
support Ukraine joining NATO (from 15.4% down to
8.8%). But those who support “eastern” military inte-
gration, i.e. Ukraine joining the Tashkent Treaty, are
not many, either — 12.5%, although there is a positive
trend here.
Such opinions have multilevel motivation, and
they cannot be explained by scepticism about NATO
alone. Apparently, people are aware that Ukraine lies
beyond the frameworks of both Western and Eastern
military-political integration — beyond NATO’s and
the EU’s enlargement processes and beyond the rele-
vant transformations in the CIS. This situation objec-
tively leaves Ukraine to be a neutral (non-aligned)
“bridge-nation”.
HOW DO UKRAINIANS SEE THE EU SECURITY
AND DEFENCE STRUCTURE?
The poll results give grounds to state that the attitude
of Ukraine’s population to the EU defence structure is
generally reserved-positive. Almost one-third of respon-
dents (32.8%) believe that the EU rapid reaction force
will be “an effective instrument of ensuring the security
of Europe”, twice fewer (17.1%) say that it will be “a
European gendarme” (Diagram “What role will the EU
rapid reaction force play?”).
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Thus, in Ukrainians’ eyes, the EU rapid reaction
force does not look like a gendarme structure (this opin-
ion is shared by a mere 17%). Although a considerable
number of respondents have no definite stance, one-third
of Ukrainians believe this EU structure to be an effective
instrument of response to crisis phenomena.
The motives for creation of the rapid reaction force
by the European Union are assessed in a similar fash-
ion. Every fifth respondent (21.2%) believes that the
European Union is creating a defence structure to
ensure stability and security in the region for safeguard-
ing its own interests, 17.7% — to extend the EU inte-
gration to the military sphere, and 16.6% are convinced
that the purpose of creating the rapid reaction force is
to diminish the US influence through NATO (Diagram
“Motives of creating the EU’s own defence structure” 4).
On the whole, the majority of respondents believe that
the EU is creating its own armed forces as an instrument
to ensure stability and security in the region for safe-
guarding its interests, as an element of its eastward
enlargement and a factor of building up its capabilities in
crisis management.
Thus, we have certain features of the attitude of
peaceful Ukrainian citizens to NATO and the EU rapid
reaction force. The comparison of their general charac-
teristics looks rather contrasting. But this contrast is
largely explained by some controversial and ill-reasoned
actions in NATO’s history, more so that the Alliance
has a lot of opponents. But the EU rapid reaction force
is starting “from a blank sheet” being rather a desired
image of a military structure. And comparisons of the
real and the desired are always in favour of the latter. At
the same time, the European force is part of the
European Union, relations with which are becoming
more active after a certain “pause”.
Therefore it is not strange that the question “Which
organisation should Ukraine give preference: NATO or
EU’s military organisation?” was answered “EU’s mili-
tary organisation “ by a plurality of respondents (35.8%).
The votes in NATO’s favour were five times (a mere 7%)
fewer (Diagram “Which organisation should Ukraine give
preference: NATO or EU’s military organisation?” ).
However, along with the obviously prevailing
favourable stance on Ukraine’s co-operation with the
European Union’s military organisation, there is an evi-
dent fact that more than a half of respondents either
abstained (32.7%) or were definitely against co-opera-
tion with the EU and NATO military structures, the lat-
ter part of respondents being the quarter of the popula-
tion of Ukraine (this expressly corresponds to the above
assessments of Ukraine’s co-operation with NATO). But
the following figure is even more expressive: the ques-
tion whether Ukraine should “directly participate in
forming rapid reaction forces and peacekeeping opera-
tions under the EU auspices” was answered positively by
nearly a half of respondents (49.7%), negatively — by
23.6%, and 26.7% abstained.
4
Respondents were supposed to give all possible answers.
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EU SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICY: 
EFFECTS ON EUROPE
It is important to note how Ukrainian citizens assess
certain effects of the European Union’s policy in the
sphere of security and defence in the context of ensur-
ing stability in Europe.
The most notable fact is that the greater part of
respondents single out the independence of CESDP
from NATO or the USA. (The priority of this position
is apparently explained by the above-mentioned ambigu-
ous attitude to the North-Atlantic Alliance). The assess-
ments are presented completely in the Diagram
“Possible effects of the EU’s Common European Security
and Defence Policy on stability in Europe”.
Notably, every fifth respondent (20.2%) gives prefer-
ence to the second position believing that the EU’s
defence policy will facilitate stronger integration ties
with non-member countries, particularly Ukraine.
At the same time, a far smaller number of respon-
dents forecast worsening relationships between the EU
and NATO (14.7%) and worsening relationships with
the USA and Russia (9%). That is, Ukrainians believe
that the strengthening of the European Union’s military
component will not affect its relations with its strategic
partner — the United States — or cause conflicts with
Russia that has been visibly stepping up activity in the
European direction of late5.
On the whole, a considerable part of Ukrainians see
CESDP as a “non-conflict” structure independent of
NATO and the USA that will facilitate contacts with the
nations which are beyond the frameworks of the EU’s
enlargement.
The majority of Ukrainians (57.3%) are convinced,
however, that the EU member-countries are interested
in involving Ukraine in security and defence co-opera-
tion. (It should be noted that this opinion corresponds
completely to the EU leadership’s position on Ukraine’s
active participation in European peacekeeping forces.
Such statements were made during J.Solana’s visit to
Kyiv (April 19, 2001) and during the Yalta Ukraine-EU
Summit (September 11, 2001)6.
The figures are presented in the Diagram “EU’s
interest in involving Ukraine in security and defence co-
operation”.
EU-NATO RAPID REACTION FORCE: 
AN ALTERNATIVE OR A COMPLEMENT?
So, a much greater part of respondents prefer
Ukraine’s defence co-operation with the EU to that
with NATO. But when it gets to prospects for co-exis-
tence of NATO and EU military organisations on the
continent, the general picture of assessments becomes
rather controversial. The public, generally negative
about NATO, is aware, however, that the North Atlantic
Alliance is now the world’s most powerful military bloc.
This awareness of real “weight categories” reflects on
assessing the effects of CESDP on NATO. The greater
part of respondents (18.4%) believe that nothing will
threaten NATO for the nearest five years; 15.9% are
convinced that NATO’s positions will become much
weaker; 14.1% predict that the balance of power in the
region will not change. Every tenth respondent (9.2%)
is positive that NATO’s existence will be jeopardised
while 8.7% are convinced that on the contrary, NATO
will only gain from co-operating with the EU in securi-
ty and defence. And finally, one-third of respondents
(33.4%) restrained from any forecasts.
These answers boil down to the following: 41.2% of
respondents think that the European military organisation
will not weaken NATO’s dominant positions, and 25.1%
are convinced that CESDP will be a serious competitor
to the Alliance.
This balance of assessments is mirrored exactly in the
answers to “what will be the EU rapid reaction force in
relation to NATO?”. Only slightly more than one-fourth
of respondents (26.5%) believes that the EU military
force will be an alternative to NATO’s military structure.
5
Speaking at the 5th Economic Forum in St.Petersberg on July 13, 2001, the Chairman of the Russian Government M.Kasyanov emphasised the intensifica-
tion of all-round contacts with the EU, stressing that “the share of the EU in Russia’s [foreign] trade turnover will rise from 35% to 50% within years”. See: WEB-
site of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation — www.mid.ru
6
At the Yalta Ukraine-EU Summit, President L.Kuchma stressed that the directions of co-operation in the area of the Common European Security and Defence
Policy, including within the framework of relevant rapid reaction force, had been more clearly identified. See: Interfax-Ukraine, September 11, 2001.
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The different opinion is shared by more than a third of
respondents (36.7%) (Diagram “What will the EU rapid
reaction force be in relation to NATO?”).
On the prospects for supra-national EU and NATO
rapid reaction forces, their role and place in the
European security system, the opinions of Ukrainians
look rather coutious and pragmatic. A major part of
respondents believe that NATO will retain its dominating
positions on the continent, and the EU’s military organ-
isation will rather be a complementing or duplicating
structure.
A certain contrast in the assessments of CESDP and
NATO, a prevailing orientation at co-operation with the
EU’s military structure while being aware of NATO’s
leading positions — this contradictory picture of assess-
ments is an indirect reflection in public conscience of
the difficulty of Ukraine’s self-identification within the
geopolitical processes on the continent. NATO’s
enlargement eastward (Poland, the Czech Republic,
Hungary) is almost five years ahead of the European
Union’s eastward enlargement. For Ukraine, however,
the establishment of relations with the EU has been
placed in the framework of specific national tasks7, and
its membership in NATO is but a subject for discussions,
a problem with many unknown quantities which is
viewed in the society from diametrically opposite posi-
tions.
Apparently, co-operation with the EU’s military
structure as NATO’s partner looks like a sort of com-
promise in the eyes of Ukrainians. It should be noted,
however, that the present level of trust in the EU’s supra-
national force depends directly on how this structure will
develop, whether it can avoid the errors and blunders that
set NATO’s authority so low in the eyes of Ukrainians.
UKRAINE’S PARTICIPATION IN CESDP: 
GAINS AND EFFECTS
What can be expected from Ukraine’s possible par-
ticipation in the creation and functioning of the
European rapid reaction force? For the most part, the
answers to this question were optimistically pragmatic,
although peacekeeping activities are known to involve
human losses and heavy employment of material and
technical resources. The latter appears quite problemat-
ic for Ukraine, considering its present economic condi-
tion. But respondents regard this problem as secondary.
Thus, among the possible gains from the participation
in the European force, the greater part of respondents
(24%) give the top place to improved material state for
the national armed forces and good prospects for the
national defence industry. The second place is given to
“providing for the Ukrainian Armed Forces combat
readiness according to the European standards” (20.1%).
The figures are presented completely in the Diagram
“Possible effects of Ukraine’s participation in the creation
and operation of the European rapid reaction force”.
As is clear, far less of the polled (18.9%) view
Ukraine’s participation in the European rapid reaction
force first and foremost as an additional economic bur-
den for this country. Still less people (14.6%) associate
7
In his speech on September 23, 2001, President L.Kuchma said, “in the next decade, the issue of accession to the European Union should be raised prac-
tically”. See: http://www.kuchma.gov.ua/main/.
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such participation with human losses, involvement in
conflicts, deterioration of image (this is unlikely to point
to the indifference to the lives of our servicemen). 
It should be added that the majority of those polled
(52.1%) believes that the cost of Ukraine’s participation
in peacekeeping operations of the European force
should be covered by the EU. Such a position seems
reasonable — economically developed European states
have far greater resources than Ukraine for the mainte-
nance of the rapid reaction force and conduct of peace-
keeping operations. 
Another thing strikes the eye: 43.8% of Ukrainian
citizens spoke in favour of joint financing of peacekeep-
ing operations. I.e., people many of whom are in a dif-
ficult economic situation, are ready to sacrifice money
that is in no way supefluous for ensuring peace and sta-
bility in our common European home. 
It is clear that the problem of our country’s partici-
pation in CESDP goes beyond the framework of
Ukraine-EU relations. In this context, the public per-
ception of the geopolitical consequences of Ukraine’s
participation in the European rapid reaction force looks
interesting, particularly regarding its relations in the
NATO-Russia-EU triangle (Diagram “Possible effects of
Ukraine’s participation in CESDP on its relations with
NATO, Russia and the EU” ). 
The greatest share of those polled (39.9%) pointed to
the positive effects of Ukraine’s participation in CESDP
on its contacts with the European Union (it is hard to
understand however what 5.5% of respondents meant
who described such effects as negative; maybe they
meant Ukraine’s inability to fulfill its commitments, as
was sometimes the case, for instance, in relations with
NATO). 
The other two groups of assessments, dealing with
Russia and NATO, also arouse attention: almost equally
small numbers of the polled (17.8% and 16.5%, respec-
tively) stressed the positive effects of Ukraine’s partici-
pation in CESDP on its relations with the Russian
Federation and the North Atlantic Alliance. 
The difference in positions as to the negative effects
is more evident (such influence on relations with the
Russian Federation was marked by every fourth respon-
dent (25%), with NÀÒÎ — by 18.5%). People are like-
ly aware that military co-operation with the EU indi-
rectly draws Ukraine closer to NATO, which objectively
runs contrary to Russia’s interests. 
Most probably, the contradictory nature of and
uncertainty in the position of Ukraine’s popualtion as to
the processes taking place on the European continent are
conditioned both by the great number and complexity of
the problems of internal transformation of the European
Union (particularly in the defence sector), and by the
lack of relevant information. 
However, it is precisely today that we are witnessing
the process of formation of public perception of the prob-
lems that are crucial for our state: EU enlargement to
Ukraine’s borders and materialisation of the Common
European security and defence policy. 
In particular, today, one can note: a positive trend
with regard to the EU rapid reaction force on the part of
Ukraine’s population; a somewhat excessive criticism of
NATO, caused, among other factors, by foreign influence
and the lack of unbiased information. 
Therefore, it seems important to use as much as pos-
sible the potential of Ukraine’s co-operation with NATO,
in parallel with the removal of the information “vacuum”
around the EU and NATO, particularly in the security
domain, to ensure the stability and irreversibility of the
process of European integration of our country. The sup-
port of Ukraine’s population for the European path for
Ukraine presents a solid foundation for this. 
